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Abstract 
Estimates of the labour supply effects of recent UK reforms in the area of direct taxes and 
benefits show that policy can have a significant influence on the level of employment. We 
confirm this in a simulation of an in-work support system introduced into the German tax and 
benefit system. Our simulation results suggest that introducing in-work tax credits in Germany 
would increase the employment of single individuals by over 100,000 but it would 
simultaneously reduce the labour supply of individuals in couples by about 70,000. We find that 
tax credits would cause significant declines of labour supply among both women and men in 
two-earner couples. The outcome derived for men in this study is especially important as it is 
markedly different from all results found for the UK, where the overall response for men has 
always been positive. Our estimation results call for a high degree of caution insofar as 
‘importing’ UK-style tax credits into Germany is concerned. In-work support based on family 
income would reinforce the existing work disincentives for secondary earners through joint 
income taxation, reducing the employment levels of both men and women living in couples.  
 
Keywords: tax-benefit system, in-work benefits, microsimulation, household labour supply 
JEL Classification: C25, C52, H31, J22 
 
                                                                          
* Peter Haan (phaan@diw.de is with the Department of Public Economics, at DIW, Berlin and at the Free 
University of Berlin. Michal Myck (mmyck@diw.de) is also with the Department of Public Economics at 
DIW, Berlin. Peter Haan gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Anglo-German Foundation 
(AGF) under the project “Optimal Income Transfer Programmes, Work Incentives, and Welfare in an 
Ageing Society – Britain and Germany Compared”. Michal Myck would like express thanks for the 
financial support provided by the REVISER project. Data from the Family Resources Survey used in this 
paper were supplied by the UK Data Archive, who bear no responsibility for its analysis or interpretation. 
Microsimulations for the UK were conducted using the tax and benefit model TAXBEN from the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies in London; we are grateful to them for making it available to us. We would like to thank 
Katharina Wrohlich, Viktor Steiner and Nicole Scheremet for valuable comments on a previous version 
of this paper and for helpful assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. Contents 
1.  Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 
2.  The UK and Germany compared – Employment rates....................................................... 2 
3.  The UK and Germany compared – Incentives to work....................................................... 5 
4.  ‘Importing’ the new tax credits to Germany....................................................................... 8 
5.  Tax credits and labour supply........................................................................................... 12 
6.  Can tax credits ‘do the trick’?........................................................................................... 16 
7.  Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 18 
Appendix................................................................................................................................... 120 
References................................................................................................................................. 122 
 | 1  
Apply with Caution: Introducing UK-Style 
In-Work Support in Germany 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 24/October 2006 
Peter Haan
 and Michal Myck 
1. Introduction 
This paper is a contribution confirming that financial incentives are of great importance for 
individual labour-supply behaviour, and that careful changes in the design of the tax and benefit 
system may be an effective way to increase employment levels. We demonstrate this using a 
detailed comparison of employment statistics for Germany and the UK, which reflects a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the differences in employment rates between the two countries for 
various types of families. Since people in each country face the same labour market conditions 
(concerning labour demand and labour market regulations) regardless of individual family 
status, these findings stress the importance of financial incentives in determining the individual 
employment status. The role of financial incentives is also confirmed in the changes in 
employment status of certain family types in the UK (especially among lone parents and fathers 
of young children) following a series of reforms to the tax and benefit system during the years 
of the Labour government.  
We also demonstrate that insofar as the generosity of the income support (social assistance) 
system is concerned, the ‘popular belief’ that support at the lower end of the income-distribution 
scale is significantly higher in Germany does not hold. We show this for a number of stylised 
households using two microsimulation models: TAXBEN for the UK and STSM for Germany. 
What we find is in fact that it is often the case that the tax and benefit system is more generous 
in Germany than in the UK at higher levels of income but not at the lowest ones. This 
conclusion implies that if one were to use the UK as a ‘role model’ for adjustments in the 
generosity of benefits in Germany, there is actually little room for manoeuvre at the lower end 
of income distribution.  
Finally, our analysis of budget constraints in Germany and the UK clearly reflects the two most 
important differences between the tax and benefit systems: the joint taxation of couples (in 
Germany) and the in-work support (in the UK). The move from joint to individual taxation in 
the UK was completed in 1999 with the abolition of joint taxation and its replacement with a 
child-related tax credit in April 2000. In Germany couples can still file a joint tax claim. In a 
recent analysis, Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) show that the employment rate of secondary earners 
in Germany would markedly increase when moving from joint taxation to individual taxation.  
The main part of our analysis focuses on the second difference between the tax and benefit 
systems in the two countries, namely in-work support. This fiscal instrument, which aims at 
subsidising low-paid employment, has been operational in several countries (e.g. the US, 
Canada and the UK) and there have been suggestions that in-work support could be used to 
make employment more attractive in Germany as well. We use a discrete choice labour-supply 
model to estimate the labour market implications of introducing UK-style in-work support in 
Germany. Our model follows the analysis of Blundell et al. (2000), who estimate the labour 
supply effects of the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK. In a similar study for 
France, Germany and Finland, Bargain & Orsini (2004) simulate the effects of in-work credits 2 | HAAN
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on the labour supply of women. We extend their analysis by allowing both men and women to 
respond to changes in financial incentives. This analytical extension turns out to be of decisive 
importance as far as policy suggestions are concerned. Our estimates show that because of 
important income effects on secondary earners, the policies would have highly negative 
implications for the employment of individuals in couples – both men and women. These 
negative effects nearly outweigh the positive effects on lone parents; the total employment 
impact of introducing UK-style in-work support in Germany is positive but modest given the 
cost of the reform (in the range of about 40,000 individuals). This result together with more 
detailed analysis of the differences in employment rates between the UK and Germany leads us 
to conclude that changing the structure of financial incentives in Germany could certainly be 
used to encourage employment. Nevertheless, given the strong negative employment response 
among couples, we conclude that in-work support based on total family incomes would not be 
an effective way of encouraging employment in Germany. A solution could come in the form of 
an individual tax credit integrated with some kind of childcare subsidy. Simply ‘importing’ the 
in-work support system from the UK will not ‘do the trick’. 
This paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present a comparison of employment 
statistics between the UK and Germany. This is followed by a comparison of budget constraints 
for several stylised family types in section 3. In section 4 we describe our approach to modelling 
labour supply in Germany and present details of how we model UK-style new tax credits 
(NTCs) in the German tax and benefit system. The results of simulating the introduction of the 
NTCs in Germany are presented in section 5. In section 6 we return to the comparison of 
employment statistics and budget constraints to identify welfare reforms that may be better 
suited to Germany than a UK-style in-work support system. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  The UK and Germany compared – Employment rates 
International comparisons of economic indicators and statistics are complicated by, among other 
things, differences in institutional frameworks. The UK and Germany, for example, have very 
different education and pension systems and both of these strongly influence the resulting 
labour market statistics. Although we limit our analysis in this paper to individuals aged 
between 25 and 59, important differences in labour market outcomes owing to institutional 
design exist between the two countries, which are presented below. Subsequently, we focus on 
detailed comparisons of employment rates, defined as the share of dependently employed and 
self-employed persons over the whole population in this age group.1 The institutional factors 
will obviously carry through to affect employment rate comparisons, but we believe that 
limiting the scope of analysis by further narrowing the age criteria would risk making the 
analysis uninteresting from a policy point of view, especially given that the population groups 
where we see the highest differences in employment rates are unlikely to be either students or 
retired persons.  
Labour market status 
Our analysis is based on the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for the UK and the Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany. The FRS is an annual cross-sectional survey that 
contains information on about 25,000 households, representing a total of 24.5 million British 
households. The GSOEP is a representative sample of private households in Germany and 
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 The comparison of labour markets focuses on employment rates, rather than on unemployment or 
participation rates, which are the two most obvious other measures, to limit the definitional and 
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includes detailed data about the socio-economic situation of over 11,000 households 
(representing about 38.8 million households in Germany). Both surveys contain detailed 
information on household incomes, hours worked and household structure.2 
We compare data for the two countries for 2002-03.3 Table 1 contains the basic breakdown by 
labour market status for Germany and the UK and is a starting point for our analysis. 
Table 1. Labour market status: UK and Germany (2002-03) 
 Breakdown  (in  %) 
 UK  Germany 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
Employees 70.09  64.7  68.46  61.54 
Self-employed 12.74  5.07  10.86  5.20 
Students 0.34  0.36  6.90  5.60 
Retired 0.21  0.55  2.88  2.27 
Unoccupied 16.63  29.32  10.90  25.39 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
 
The overall employment rate in the UK (counting both the employees and the self-employed) is 
3.5 percentage points higher for men and 3 percentage points higher for women in the UK than 
in Germany. At the same time, however, the proportion of students and early retirees is much 
higher in Germany, which leads to lower proportion of individuals classified as ‘unoccupied’.4 
Bearing in mind the differences in the student and retiree status between the two countries, in 
our chosen age group below we present employment rates separately for lone persons and 
individuals living in couples (married and cohabiting).  
Employment rates 
The employment rates are presented for different family types, distinguished by the presence of 
children younger than 17 years old. The picture that emerges from Tables 2-4 is (unsurprisingly) 
that the patterns of employment are strongly related to family structure. What is striking though 
is that there are important differences in employment conditional on these characteristics 
between the UK and Germany.  
The overall employment rate in Germany for single persons is slightly higher than in the UK 
(see Table 2), a difference that stems from much higher employment rates of single women in 
Germany (a 4.3 percentage point difference).5 Disaggregating employment statistics for single 
                                                                          
2
 A description of the GSOEP can be downloaded from www.diw.de/soep; see also Haisken–De New & 
Frick (2001). 
3 
For Germany, we use the data collected in 2003 as they contain information about the fiscal year 2002. 
The FRS data is collected to overlap with the government budget calendar, i.e. from April to March. 
When we refer to a dataset as that for 2002-03, it covers the period of April 2002 to March 2003. 
4
 These levels are consistent with OECD statistics on employment for the two countries (see OECD, 
2005). 
5
 This is mainly related to the higher labour market participation of women in East Germany. As 
documented in previous literature, owing to the diverse histories of the two labour markets, the behaviour 
of women from East and West Germany is still quite different, see e.g. (Haan & Steiner, 2005). 4 | HAAN
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adults depending on whether or not they have children (below 17 years old) also gives higher 
employment rates for Germany, this time by over 10 percentage points. This could seem at odds 
with the existing in-work support system, which increases incentives for the labour market 
employment of lone parents. Yet, as Table A1 in the Appendix shows, the employment rate for 
lone parents in the UK prior to the introduction of the Labour government’s package of reforms 
was as low as 38.7%. From this starting level, a remarkable rise is indicated in the employment 
of this group of persons of about 14 percentage points in the space of six years.  
Table 2. Employment rates of single individuals – UK and Germany, 2002-03 
  Employment rate (in %) 
 UK  Germany 
All singles  67.91 68.17 
Male singles  71.69  68.20 
Female singles  63.84  68.14 
Singles without children <17  71.48  69.11 
Singles with children <17  52.43  62.74 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
 
The employment rates for persons in couples (Table 3) are higher in the UK for both men and 
women, which is the case for couples with and without children. An interesting similarity 
between the two countries is that the difference in employment rates between those with and 
without children is the same for both countries: about 5-6% for men and 11-12% for women. 
Table 3. Employment rates of individuals in couples – UK and Germany, 2002-03 
  Employment rate (in %) 
 UK  Germany 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
All couples  87.90  72.36  83.32  66.60 
Couples without children <17  85.35  77.99  79.73  72.83 
Couples with children <17  90.32  67.03  86.83  60.51 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
 
In Table 4 we break down these employment rates at the level of couples, by dividing couples 
into two-earner, one-earner (where either the woman or the man works) and no-earner couples. 
This approach sheds more light on the differences between the two countries. As we can see 
above, the proportion of two-earner couples is lower in Germany for all couples, regardless of 
whether or not they have children. The overall proportion of no-earner couples is very similar at 
about 7%. It is interesting to note that the proportion of couples in which only the woman works 
is almost twice as high in Germany as it is in the UK.  
The breakdown of employment rates by family type shows that the differences between the two 
labour markets are far from uniform. There are important population groups in which 
employment rates are either almost identical or are even higher in Germany than in the UK. 
This variation raises important questions related to the labour-market policy response in both 
countries. We think that it would be difficult to explain these differences in terms of labour 
demand factors. The latter could either be considered to be the same for all individuals APPLY WITH CAUTION: INTRODUCING UK-STYLE IN-WORK SUPPORT IN GERMANY | 5 
 
regardless of their marital or family status, or at least to be the same for specific types of 
families. One could argue, for example, that employers would be less willing to employ 
individuals with parental obligations (for example because of the cost of child-related leave). 
This argument should, however, apply equally strongly to lone parents and parents living in 
couples. In this case the employment rates we present show that while lone parents are more 
likely to be employed in Germany (an employment rate of 62.7% versus 52.4%) the rates for 
parents in couples are higher in the UK for men (90.3% versus 86.8%) and especially for 
women (67.0% versus 60.5%).  
Table 4. Employment rates of individuals in couples for the UK and Germany, 2002-03 (in %) 
Proportion by employment status:  All couples   No child aged 
<17 in family 
Child aged <17 in 
family 
UK      
  Two-earner  67.17 71.08  63.46 
  Single-earner – man employed  20.73  14.27  26.86 
  Single-earner – woman employed  5.20  6.91  3.57 
  No-earner  6.90  7.74  6.11 
Germany        
  Two-earner  56.80  59.75  53.91 
  Single-earner – man employed  26.52  19.99  32.91 
  Single-earner – woman employed  9.81  13.08  6.60 
  No-earner  6.88  7.19  6.57 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
 
The above finding implies that differences in the tax and social security burdens between 
Germany and the UK and the institutional arrangements that affect demand for labour are 
insufficient to explain the differences in employment patterns between the two countries. An 
explanation of the differences between employment rates among various family types must 
largely relate to the supply side of the labour market. Here the common approach is to argue that 
the high generosity of the German benefit system is to blame for its lower employment rates. 
Below we look at some details of the financial incentives that various types of families 
encounter in a range of employment scenarios.  
3.  The UK and Germany compared – Incentives to work 
In this section we look at examples of the budget constraints that different types of families face 
in Germany and the UK. We focus on the tax and benefit system of the year 2002-03 as the 
above-mentioned statistics represent the population during that year. The analysis sheds some 
doubt on the popular belief that the levels of social assistance in Germany are significantly 
higher. We show that disposable incomes at various levels of employment intensity are very 
similar between the two countries.6 The only noticeable differences in the ‘shape’ of the budget 
constraint are for secondary earners in couples and at the points of highest generosity of in-work 
support in the UK. We return to this issue at the end of this section. Note, however, that this 
                                                                          
6 
The monetary values used for comparative purposes are expressed in euros using the exchange rate of 
€/₤ = 0.6821. To express weekly values of net incomes and benefits (as is standard practice in the UK) in 
monthly terms (as is standard in Germany) we multiply weekly values by a factor of 4.35 – the average 
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comparison needs to be interpreted carefully as we focus only on the tax and benefit system but 
leave out a comparison of important institutions, such as labour market institutions, the 
educational system, the generosity and quality of public healthcare and other types of public 
expenditure. For better comparison, we assume in all examples for Germany that individuals are 
not eligible for the insurance-based unemployment benefit (arbeitslosengeld) as this is not a 
permanent transfer. Instead, households receive means-tested social benefits that are the 
equivalent to the UK’s income support. 
Figure 1 presents comparisons of budget constraints for two types of families: a single woman 
without children and a single woman with two children. The budget lines are drawn under the 
assumption that the woman is earning the 25
th percentile wage for women (specific for each 
country: €7.76 in the UK and €9.92 in Germany). Similar budget lines are drafted for one-earner 
couples (Figure 2) and two-earner couples (Figure 3). Here we assume that the man is working 
at a country-specific median wage for men (€14.75 in the UK and €16.81 in Germany) and once 
more we present the budget lines for families without children and with two children.  
Figure 1. Budget constraints in 2002 for a single woman (renting) with and without children 
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Notes: For each country we consider a single woman working at the 25
th percentile hourly wage, 
renting at the cost of median rent. The 25
th percentile wage for women in the UK is €7.76 and in 
Germany is €9.92.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 show that at the lowest levels of earnings, i.e. in scenarios where the families 
qualify for the basic means-tested support, the disposable incomes of families in Germany and 
the UK (conditional on family type) is almost identical. Differences become apparent only at 
hours levels beyond 20 per week.  
For single persons without children the difference in disposable income beyond 20 hours of 
work results primarily because of the higher nominal hourly wage in Germany. Given the 
variations in the tax burden between the two countries, this difference falls as income rises. It is 
interesting to note that in the UK the incomes of lone parents with two children are higher in the 
hours range between 26 and 60 working hours.7 This is the result of the generous in-work 
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The same applies to lone parent families with one child (not shown in Figure 2) in the hours range 
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support that these families are eligible for in the form of the WFTC. The difference is highest 
(€212 per month) at the level of 36 hours of work per week. 
Figure 2. Budget constraints in 2002 for a one-earner couple (renting) with and without 
children 
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Notes: For each country we consider a one-earner couple to be one in which a man is working at the 
mean hourly wage, renting at the cost of median rent. The median wage for men in the UK is €14.75 
and €16.81 in Germany.  
 
Beyond the level of about 20 hours of work one-earner couples in Germany are better off than 
in the UK in our examples. This finding is especially strongly evident for couples with two 
children when the earner in the couple works more than 50 hours per week. From about this 
point onwards the UK example family no longer receives in-work support. At hours above 40 
the example UK family with children has a very similar disposable income to the German 
childless couple. 
There are significant differences between Germany and the UK for one-earner families without 
children. At 26 hours of work the UK one-earner couple receives €236 less per month than the 
couple in Germany and the difference remains at above €150 per month for higher levels of 
hours. The factor responsible for it is only partly the difference in the underlying nominal gross 
wages (we do not see a divergence in disposable income for higher levels of hours worked). The 
most important determinant of these differences is the income-splitting for individuals in 
married couples. As we see below this also has important consequences for the financial 
incentives of secondary earners in couples (see Figure 3). The higher disposable incomes of 
families with children in Germany relate primarily to the receipt of the universal Kindergeld 
(which in 2002 was €154 for every child per month). 
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Figure 3. Budget constraints in 2002 for a secondary earner in a couple with and without 
children 
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Notes: For each country we consider a one-earner couple to be one in which a man is working at the mean 
hourly wage, renting at the cost of median rent. The median wage for men in the UK is €14.75 and €16.81 in 
Germany.  
 
For two-earner couples we find strong differences between the two countries, which are mainly 
owing to the income-splitting for couples and the exemption from social security contributions 
and income taxation up to a certain threshold of individual gross earnings in Germany. This 
threshold was €325 per month in 2002. After this threshold all earnings are subject to social 
security contributions and to income taxation. At this point, marginal tax rates for the secondary 
earner are relatively high because of the income-splitting. Therefore, we observe the kink in the 
budget line of the secondary earner for Germany. This provides strong disincentives for the 
secondary earner to take up work beyond €325. When considered against comparable 
households in the UK, households in Germany have a higher disposable income. This difference 
decreases with the number of working hours of the secondary earner as the advantage of the 
income-splitting vanishes. The advantage of income-splitting is dependent on the wage 
difference of both spouses (Steiner & Wrohlich, 2004). 
4.  ‘Importing’ the new tax credits to Germany 
New tax credits 
We saw in section 3 that one of the main differences in terms of the tax and benefit systems 
between the UK and Germany is the system of in-work support. This section begins with a brief 
outline of the current (2005) system of in-work support in the UK. This discussion is followed 
by a review of recent tax and benefit changes in Germany and how we integrate the elements of 
the UK system with the current German one. The section ends with some (non-behavioural) 
estimates of the costs of the reform and its distributional consequences. APPLY WITH CAUTION: INTRODUCING UK-STYLE IN-WORK SUPPORT IN GERMANY | 9 
 
In April 2003 the Labour government implemented major changes to the structure of the tax and 
benefit system in the UK.8 The reform (commonly known as the new tax credit (or NTC) 
reform) consolidated several elements of support for families with children into the Child Tax 
Credit,9 an instrument that specifically relates to having children and is independent of work 
status. The Child Tax Credit is made up of a family premium (about €60 per month) and credits 
for every child in the family. The child credits begin to be withdrawn when gross annual family 
income exceeds €20,400, while the family premium does so when pre-tax income exceeds 
€73,300. To preserve the financial incentives for low-income families to work the government 
introduced the Working Tax Credit, which retains the condition for the minimum number of 
hours worked characteristic of the WFTC from the pre-reform system. To receive the Working 
Tax Credit one adult in families with children has to work at least 16 hours per week, and there 
is a full-time ‘premium’ for those working more than 30 hours per week. The Working Tax 
Credit is also available for families without children, for which the minimum hours condition is 
30 hours per week; it begins to be withdrawn once annual gross family income exceeds €7,650. 
The generosity of the NTC support system is presented in Figure 4 for a one-earner couple with 
two, one and without children.10 
Figure 4. Generosity of the NTCs in April 2005 
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Note: The assumed hourly wage is €10.47 (which is the 25
th percentile wage for men in the UK).   
 
Recent reforms in Germany 
Since 2002-03, the year for which we show the employment statistics in section 2, Germany has 
also seen important changes in the design of the tax and benefit system. Both income taxation 
                                                                          
8
 For a detailed discussion of the 2003 reforms see Brewer et al. (2005). The NTCs also include a 
generous childcare credit, additional premiums for families with newborn babies and for working 
disabled people. These are not modeled in our paper.  
9
 Specifically, it enveloped the family and child premiums in income support, the Child Tax Credits from 
the WFTC and the Children’s Tax Credit (which was part of the PAYE income tax). 
10 
As noted above, the NTCs include a generous childcare credit, additional premiums for families with 
newborn babies and for working disabled people, which are not modeled in our paper.  10 | HAAN
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and the benefit system have been reformed with the aim of improving incentives in the labour 
market. We think it is important to account for these changes, and therefore we ‘import’ the UK 
system of in-work support taking the 2005 system as the baseline for the reform.  
On the taxation side, between the years 2000 and 2005 the German government introduced the 
most ambitious income-tax reform in Germany’s post-war history. The main goal of the reform, 
which was implemented in three steps (2001, 2004 and 2005), was a reduction of the burden 
and distortions of taxation for both companies and private households. By the beginning of 
2005, the top marginal rate of the personal income tax had been reduced to 42%, compared with 
51% in 2000. In the same period, the lowest marginal tax rate had been reduced from 22.9% to 
15%, and the basic tax allowance had been increased from €6,902 to €7,664. The tax schedule 
between 2002 and 2005 was only affected by the second and third steps of the reform. The tax 
relief related to the two last steps amounts to about €20 bn. Haan & Steiner (2005) provide a 
detailed description of the reform and simulate the labour supply and employment effects of the 
reform. They show that the reform significantly increased labour supply incentives, especially 
for households with a relatively high income.  
On the transfer side the ‘Hartz reform’, implemented between 2003 and 2005, had an impact on 
work incentives, particularly for low-income households. For our analysis three policies of the 
Hartz legislation are of importance: the mini-job reform, the reform of income support and the 
introduction of a child supplement. The mini-job reform extended the threshold for the subsidies 
of social security contributions and income taxation to individual gross earnings up to €400 per 
month. Further, high marginal tax rates on earnings above this threshold were reduced, by 
introducing a modified subsidy up to €800 per month. This reform is described in detail in 
Steiner & Wrohlich (2005) and its effects on work incentives have been estimated by, e.g. 
Steiner & Wrohlich (2005) and Bargain et al. (2005). In the course of the Hartz reform the 
previous income support ‘sozialhilfe’ was combined with ‘arbeitslosenhilfe’. Relative to the 
year 2002, the income support for those out of work in 2005 was slightly more generous and the 
withdrawal rate changed.11 The child supplement is similar to an in-work credit as only working 
families receive this benefit. Nevertheless, in comparison with the in-work credits implemented 
in other countries, the child supplement is not a generous transfer. Owing to the withdrawal 
design of this instrument in combination with the existing income support, the child supplement 
hardly affects work incentives for families with children.  
Introducing UK in-work support to the German system  
The system from 2005 is used as a baseline for the exercise of importing the UK NTC system 
(henceforth simply ‘tax credits’). The system is implemented maintaining the rules that concern 
the interaction of the tax credits with other means-tested benefits. Specifically, we assume that 
income from tax credits is included in the means test for income support, which is withdrawn at 
the rate of 100%. As far as the generosity of the tax credits is concerned, we have decided to 
exclude the family premium element of the UK’s Child Tax Credit. This is done on the grounds 
that such extension of child-related support rather far up the income-distribution level in a 
system with an already high level of universal support (for the first three children, €154 per 
child per month) would be very costly and therefore unlikely to be implemented. The resulting 
changes in the budget constraints are demonstrated in Figures 5 and 6, for single persons and 
couples respectively. Figure 5 shows budget constraints for a single person with and without 
children, working at the 25
th percentile hourly wage (€9.92) for women. In Figure 6 we present 
budget lines for a couple household with one child. One set of lines shows the budget 
constraints under the assumption that only one partner is working at the median wage for men 
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(€16.81), while the other set shows constraints for the secondary earner working at the 25
th 
percentile wage (€9.92) for women, under the assumption that the first earner works full-time at 
the median wage for men (€16.81). For all example families we show budget constraints as they 
were in 2002, then the constraints associated with the baseline (2005) system and finally the 
budget constraints that would result from introducing the tax credits in Germany.   
Figure 5. Disposable incomes under three tax and benefit systems: Single persons 
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Notes: We consider a single woman working at the 25
th percentile hourly wage, renting at the cost of 
median rent. The 25
th percentile wage for a woman in Germany is €9.92. 
Figure 6. Disposable incomes under three tax and benefit systems: Couples 
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Notes: For each country we consider a one-earner couple to be one in which the man is working at the mean 
hourly wage, renting at the cost of median rent. The median wage for men in the UK is €14.75 and €16.81 for 
Germany. 12 | HAAN
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We can see that single individuals without children would be only marginally affected by the 
introduction of tax credits – as is represented by a small increase in disposable income at 30 
hours of work relative to the 2005 system. The same is true for childless couples who would not 
be affected at all if the earner receives the median hourly wage for men (we therefore do not 
present budget constraints for childless couples in the figures). The tax credits, however, lead to 
important income increases for lone parents and couples with children. A lone parent earning 
the 25
th percentile hourly wage for women would see her/his income rise by €152.40 per month 
at 16 hours of work and by €236.70 at 34 hours of work. A one-earner couple, on the other 
hand, could see their income rise by as much as €456 per month (at 32 hours of work). An 
interesting point to note is that the combination of the withdrawal of subsidies of social security 
contributions and the tax credits implies that the difference in family disposable income arising 
from the work of the secondary earner falls from €441.70 to €155.06 per month as a result of 
introducing the tax credits. As we see below this type of income effect would lead to important 
withdrawals from employment among two-earner couples. 
Disregarding the behavioural effects of such a reform, the overall net cost of introducing tax 
credits in Germany is about €11 bn. The government would need to spend about €19 bn on the 
tax credits, but the cost of the means-tested income benefits (ALG II) would fall by about €8 bn. 
The reforms would have a rather clear distributional effect – with families in the second and 
third decile gaining most (respectively €52.10 (4.0%) and €60.00 (3.7%) per month on average) 
and the gains falling for households higher up the income scale. Families in the first decile 
would gain on average only about €25.80 (3.4%), which is principally because there are fewer 
families with children in the first decile, and secondly because many of the poorest families do 
not meet the hours condition to be eligible for tax credits.12 
5.  Tax credits and labour supply 
In order to evaluate the behavioural effects of introducing tax credits in Germany we estimate 
the labour supply responses of households. We follow the method of Blundell et al. (2000) by 
simulating the changes in working hours and labour market participation on the basis of a 
discrete choice labour-supply model. The main advantage of the discrete-choice approach 
compared with continuous specifications of labour supply derives from the possibility to model 
nonlinearities in budget functions.13 Furthermore, the modelling allows us to assess the labour 
supply effects on the household level rather than the individual level, by specifying a joint 
labour-supply model for cohabiting and married couples. A detailed specification of the model 
can be found in the Appendix; for further information with descriptive statistics and a 
discussion of the main results, see Bargain et al. (2005). Note, we follow Blundell et al. (2000) 
and assume that households can freely choose their working hours and are not restricted by 
labour demand constraints. We estimate the model on a restricted sample of households in 
which both spouses are aged between 25 and 59, not in education and not self-employed.14 The 
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 We assume that working hours can be described by a distribution with 6 discrete points. We define 
hours intervals as (0, [0,12], [12,20], [20,34], [34,40], >40) according to the empirical distribution in the 
data (GSOEP, 2003). The empirical mean of the distribution describes the discrete hours point. For 
couples we assume a joint labour-supply model and specify 6x6 discrete points. For more details, see 
Bargain et al. (2005).  
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 We have estimated the effect of tax credits on couples in which one spouse is either self-employed, in 
education or retired, or older than 59. We find that the effects for both men and women are negligible. 
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database is the GSOEP 2003; hence we estimate the preferences for work and disposable 
income for the fiscal year 2002.15 
Based on the labour supply estimation we simulate the labour supply effects resulting from the 
introduction of the tax credits. Using the microsimulation model STSM, which models the 
German tax and benefit system in detail (Steiner et al., 2005), we simulate the net household 
income for two scenarios at the defined discrete hours points: i) the fiscal system of the year 
2005, which includes the implemented reforms between 2002 and 2005 described in section 4; 
and ii) a hypothetical scenario in which we introduce the tax credits into the system of 2005 as 
described in section 4. For each household we simulate the probabilities of choosing each point 
for the status quo scenario 2002 and the two simulated scenarios. The differences in the 
probabilities yield the labour supply responses induced by the respective reforms. In order to 
disentangle the work incentives resulting from the introduction of the tax credits we calculate 
the differences in the employment effects induced by the two simulated scenarios. 
Tables 5 to 7 present the labour supply effects by household type and region with regard to 
changes in both employment and working hours. 
Single households 
As discussed above, the tax credits provide positive labour-supply incentives for single 
households, in particular for lone parents as tax credits are most generous for this group (Table 
5). We simulate that the overall employment rate of single women increases by more than 
95,000 or about 2.9%. This effect is almost exclusively borne by lone mothers. Single women 
without children in the western part of Germany hardly change their labour supply behaviour; 
the same group in the eastern half reacts slightly more. This difference stems from the higher 
gains from the tax credits reform for East Germans as their average earnings are markedly lower 
than in the western part of the country. The same holds true for lone mothers. The relative 
change in participation in East Germany (at 15%) is more than twice as high as the change for 
lone mothers in West Germany (6.5%). A very similar picture emerges when turning to the 
changes in the weekly working hours.  
For single men the effects of the tax credits are relatively modest, the main reason being that the 
number of lone fathers in Germany is very low. The overall participation effect amounts to 
about 10,000, a figure that translates into a relative increase of 0.34%. Again, the effects in East 
Germany are higher, both in relative and in absolute numbers. The impact on the working hours 
of single men is moderate as well. Weekly working hours increase by about 0.30%. 
Couple households 
The overall effect of the tax credits on the labour supply of men and women in couples is 
negative (Table 6). As discussed above this is because the tax credits are based on household 
rather than on individual earnings and for eligibility only one spouse needs to fulfil the working 
requirements. The total employment among women in couples decreases by more than 55,000, 
which amounts to a decrease of about 0.8%. Again the effect is mainly borne by women with 
children. The effect on couple households without children is basically zero. As for single 
women, the effect on the participation rate and the relative change in working hours for women 
in East Germany are higher. For men living in couples, we find smaller negative effects of the 
tax credits. Employment among men in couples decreases by about 13,000 or 0.16%. The 
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reduction in working hours is relatively high (-0.46%), as the share of men working full-time or 
overtime in the baseline scenario is high.  
Table 5. Effect of tax credits on single individuals 
  Change in participation  Change in number of hours 
(unconditional) 
  Absolute (in  %) Absolute 
(in 000s):  (in %) 
Women:      
   West         
   – no children  400  0.019  28.6  0.041 
   – with children  59,400  6.474  1,676.4  5.953 
   East         
   – no children  1,000  0.356  63.2  0.588 
   – with children  34,500  15.002  1,244.8  15.166 
   Total – women  95,300  2.914  3,013.0  2.583 
Men:      
   – with children  2,400  1.728  92.1  1.634 
   – without children  7,200  0.273  279.4  0.260 
   West  3,900  0.167  132.5  0.139 
   East  5,700  1.239  222.7  1.209 
   Total – men  9,600  0.344  355.2  0.312 
Notes: Simulation built by drawing 100 times from the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity and 
allocating each observation to the alternative that yields maximum utility (e.g. see Blundell et al., 2000). 
Absolute change in participation is rounded to the nearest 100.  
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
Table 6. Effect of tax credits on individuals in couples 
  Change in participation  Change in number of hours 
(unconditional) 
  Absolute (in  %) Absolute 
(in 000s):  (in %) 
Women      
   West         
   – no children  100  0.005  4.9  0.006 
   – with children  -43,000  -1.330  -1,033.3  -1.405 
   East         
   – no children  0  -0.002  1.1  0.008 
   – with children  -12,600  -1.499  -635.7  -2.169 
Total – women  -55,500  -0.813  -1,663.0  -0.850 
Men      
   West         
   – no children  -100  -0.004  -5.0  -0.005 
   – with children  -2,000  -0.044  -956.7  -0.494 
   East         
   – no children  -100  -0.016  -3.7  -0.019 
   – with children  -11,300  -1.268  -656.9  -1.708 
Total – men  -13,400  -0.163  -1,622.2  -0.460 
Notes: Simulation built by drawing 100 times from the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity and 
allocating each observation to the alternative that yields maximum utility (e.g. see Blundell et al., 2000). 
Absolute change in participation is rounded to the nearest 100.  
Source: Authors’ simulations. APPLY WITH CAUTION: INTRODUCING UK-STYLE IN-WORK SUPPORT IN GERMANY | 15 
 
Effect by employment status of the spouses 
As shown previously in Table 4, in Germany the share of couple households in which both 
spouses are working is relatively low in comparison to the UK. In contrast, the share of one-
earner households is relatively high. Our findings indicate that the introduction of the UK-style 
tax credits further increases the differences between the two countries in this respect. In order to 
accurately simulate the impact of the tax credits by the employment status of the spouses we 
have to compare the participation effect relative to the base scenario in 2002, since the 
employment status can be only observed in this year (Table 7). The first column yields the 
observed number of households within each group for the year 2002, the second column the 
simulated effect for the fiscal year 2005, and the third column the simulated effects for the 
hypothetical system including the tax credits. In order to disentangle the effect of the tax credit 
we take the difference between the employment effect of the two simulated systems (column 4).  
Table 7. Effect of tax credits (TCs) on couples conditional on a combination of partners’ 
employment 
  2002 system 
(in 000s) 
2005 system 
(in 000s) 
TCs 
(in 000s) 
Effect of TCs 
(in 000s) 
Women:        
   – (0,0)  0.0  23.6  32.0  8.5 
   – (1,0)  0.0  82.6  76.3  -6.3 
   – (0,1)  478.3  473.8  469.9  -3.9 
   – (1,1)  6,339.8  6,314.1  6,260.3  -53.8 
Men:        
   – (0,0)  0.0  27.0  53.1  26.1 
   – (1,0)  2,093.9  2,079.8  2,072.0  -7.8 
   – (0,1)  0.0  35.3  33.5  -1.8 
   – (1,1)  6,121.2  6,097.4  6,067.6  -29.9 
Notes: Simulation built by drawing 100 times from the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity and 
allocating each observation to the alternative that yields maximum utility (e.g. see Blundell et al., 2000).  
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
 
As a result of introducing the tax credits we observe an employment effect for couples in which 
neither of the spouses was working in 2002. Relative to the fiscal system in the year 2005 this 
effect is particularly high for men (26,000) but is non-negligible for women (8,500). As shown 
in Table 4, one-earner couples in which the man is working are far more common in Germany 
than couples in which the woman is the sole earner. This characteristic explains the stronger 
increase for men than for women. 
Yet this positive employment effect is clearly outweighed by the negative effect of the tax 
credits on the other groups. In particular the number of couples in which both spouses used to 
work in the year 2002 markedly decreases. The effect of the tax credit implies that more than 
50,000 women and nearly 30,000 men leave this group. The effect on one-earner couples is 
relatively small. In comparison to the effects of the fiscal system in 2005, the impact of the tax 
credits slightly reduces employment within these groups, for both men and women.  
These results imply that owing to the tax credits the share of two-earner couples in Germany 
would decline further, widening the gap between the UK and Germany. In addition, the 
decomposition by employment status of the couples underlines the importance of estimating not 
only the labour supply effects of women but also of men. We show that the tax credits have a 
strong impact on men’s employment decisions, positively or negatively, dependent on their 
initial employment state.  16 | HAAN
 & MYCK
 
 
Labour supply effects of in-work support in other studies 
Bargain & Orsini (2004) simulate the labour supply effects of the British WFTC as it was 
implemented in 1999 for single women and women in couples for several countries, including 
Germany. In general, our results point in the same direction as their findings. Bargain & Orsini 
(2004) show that the in-work credit has a positive effect on the labour supply behaviour of 
single women and a negative effect on the behaviour of women living in couples. They find, 
however, that the negative effects on women in couples outweigh the positive effects achieved 
for singles. This difference is mainly owing to the different generosity of the simulated in-work 
credits. In comparison with the studies of Blundell at al. (2000) and Gregg et al. (1999), which 
focus on the effects of the 1999 WFTC reform in the UK, we find greater labour supply effects, 
which is not surprising since we model the introduction of the full system and not only increases 
in its generosity (as is the case in these two studies). The important difference between the 
results for the UK and Germany concern couples. Both the UK studies (as well as subsequent 
estimates of the effect of the WFTC in e.g. Brewer et al., 2005, Blundell et al., 2005 and Myck 
& Reed, 2005) find positive net effects on the employment of men in couples. For Germany we 
find that over 13,000 men living in couples would leave employment. Moreover, if we take the 
overall employment effect on individuals living in couples measured as a proportion of the 
positive effect on single individuals, we find that it is –19% in the case of Blundell et al. (2000) 
and is positive (+14%) in the case of Gregg et al. (1999).16 In our estimation we find that the 
negative effect on couples is –66% of the effect on single persons. This finding suggests a very 
different (relative) responsiveness among individuals in couples in Germany and calls for a lot 
of caution in applying means-tested policies based on total family income.  
6.  Can tax credits ‘do the trick’? 
We saw in the previous section that introduction of the tax credits in Germany would have an 
overall positive effect on employment but this effect would be small (in the range of 35,000) 
and there would be a negative effect on the labour supply of individuals in couples in the range 
of 70,000. The principal reason behind the effect on couples is that the policy impact on the 
income on secondary earners would lead many of them to give up work. This negative effect on 
two-earner couples would not be outweighed by increases in employment among couples in 
which (in the baseline scenario) both partners are out of work.  
Below we return to the analysis of employment statistics. On the one hand this is done to find an 
explanation for our results in the employment patterns in Germany. On the other hand we want 
to look more closely at families with children to see if differences in employment between the 
UK and Germany suggest any specific groups that could be targeted from the point of view of 
employment policy.  
In Tables 8, 9 and 10 we present a further breakdown of employment rates for men and women 
with children. The additional disaggregation is conditional on the age of the youngest child in 
the family, and we divide the sample into those with the youngest children aged 0-3, 4-6 and 7-
16. As in section 2, statistics are presented for single persons (Table 8) and couples (Table 9). 
Table 10 presents the proportion of couples with children conditional on the employment status 
of the parents.  
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Table 8. Employment rates of single individuals in the UK and Germany, 2002-03 
  Employment rate (in %) 
 UK  Germany 
Singles with children <17  52.43  62.74 
Singles with children: youngest 0-3  33.08  32.30 
Singles with children: youngest 4-6  50.78  49.10 
Singles with children: youngest 7-16  60.26  73.37 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
 
Table 9. Employment rates of individuals in couples in the UK and Germany, 2002-03 
  Employment rate (in %) 
 UK  Germany 
  Men Women Men Women 
Couples with children <17  90.32  67.03  86.83  60.51 
Couples with children – youngest: 0-3  92.53  51.77  83.74  40.02 
Couples with children – youngest: 4-6  89.64  67.41  89.53  58.37 
Couples with children – youngest: 7-16 89.16  76.57  87.60  72.34 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
Table 10. Employment rates of individuals in couples in the UK and Germany, 2002-03 (in %) 
Proportion by employment status   Child <17 
in family 
Youngest 
child 
aged 
 0-3 
Youngest 
child 
aged 
4-6 
Youngest 
child 
aged 
7-16 
UK        
Two-earner 63.46  50.06  64.45  71.60 
Single earner – man employed  26.86  42.47  25.18  17.55 
Single earner – woman employed  3.57  1.71  2.95  4.97 
No-earner 6.11  5.77  7.41  5.87 
Germany:      
Two-earner 53.91  34.42  54.58  64.26 
Single-earner – man employed  32.91  49.32  34.95  23.34 
Single-earner – woman employed  6.60  5.59  3.79  8.09 
No-earner 6.57  10.67  6.68  4.32 
Source: FRS (2002-03) and GSOEP (2003). 
 
Several interesting facts emerge from this additional disaggregation of employment statistics. 
First of all, the group of lone parents ‘responsible’ for the relatively higher employment rates 
among single persons in Germany seems to be the lone parents with school-age children. Only 
for this group there is a big difference in employment rates, with 73.4% of lone parents with 
school-age children employed in Germany and only 60.3% in the UK. Looking at the average 
employment rates for lone parents in Germany we could conclude that (at least relative to the 18 | HAAN
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UK) employment among this group does not seem to be a major concern. Nevertheless, given 
that there is this large discrepancy within Germany in employment rates between parents with 
pre-school and school-age children, perhaps addressing the factors constraining parents of 
younger children from taking up employment would be an efficient way to increase the overall 
employment rate. As shown earlier the tax credits are very effective in increasing the 
employment of single persons. Over 100,000 individuals would move into work following the 
introduction of tax credits. Depending on the design of the implemented system, the effect 
would be high especially among lone parents (over 96,000). Of these, 44,000 have children 
below school age, so tax credits could play an important role in increasing employment among 
this group. The policy could be extended to include childcare support (as is the case in the UK) 
and then the effect on parents with the youngest children would most probably be even higher.17  
Differences between the UK and Germany in employment rates for individuals living in couples 
also vary by the age of the youngest child. Among men the group that seems to ‘turn’ the 
overall employment statistic for fathers in the UK’s favour is that of fathers with very young 
children (aged 0-3). For this group the employment rate in the UK is 92.5%, while in Germany 
it is only 83.7%. On the other hand we once again find that for women the difference in 
employment rates is smallest among those in couples with school-age children, so as in the case 
of lone parents Germany is lagging behind the UK insofar as the employment of people with 
pre-school age children is concerned. It is for these groups of individuals in couples that we 
have seen the highest increases in employment since 1996 in the UK (see Appendix Table A3) 
and so perhaps a form of in-work support could be used to encourage employment among these 
groups in Germany as well. Yet, as we argued above the extent of the negative employment 
effect of tax credits in Germany is (relatively) much higher than in the UK, and such an in-work 
support policy could backfire and result in lower and not higher employment among individuals 
in couples. Clearly, as in the case of lone parents, assistance with childcare could encourage 
more individuals from no-earner couples to take up employment, but this may still not be 
enough to outweigh the negative response of secondary earners in two-earner couples.  
Thus if the German government considers low employment levels among couples with children 
to be an area of concern, then perhaps it would be more effective to consider other policies 
supporting the low-paid in work and targeted at the secondary earner. Such policies could 
include a move away from joint taxation (see Steiner & Wrohlich, 2004) and perhaps some 
form of individual tax credit (based on individual and not family income). The latter policy 
could bring the desired effects of increasing employment among lone parents and would not 
have equally strong disincentive effects on secondary earners in couples.18 Given the differences 
between the UK and Germany in the pattern of employment conditional on the age of the 
youngest child, perhaps the policies could be focused on specific groups of parents.     
7. Conclusion 
Estimates of labour supply effects from recent UK reforms in the area of direct taxes and 
benefits show that policy can have a significant influence on the level of employment. We 
confirm this in a simulation of an in-work support system on German data. Our simulation 
results suggest that introducing in-work tax credits in Germany would increase the employment 
of single individuals by over 100,000, but it would result in a reduction of labour supply among 
individuals in couples by about 70,000.  
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Our analysis of employment rates has demonstrated that differences in employment between 
Germany and the UK are far from homogenous across various family types. This finding relates 
especially to patterns of employment within couples, with one-earner families being much more 
common in Germany. Importing a UK-style in-work support system into Germany would 
further increase this difference. The results of our simulations suggest that tax credits would 
result in significant reductions of labour supply among both women and men in two-earner 
couples. These reductions would not be matched by increases in labour supply among one-
earner or no-earner couples, so the overall labour supply effects would be negative for both men 
and women. The outcome derived for men is especially important as it is markedly different 
from all results found for the UK, where the overall response among men has always been 
found to be positive. These estimated effects call for a high degree of caution insofar as 
importing UK-style tax credits into Germany is concerned. In-work support based on family 
income would increase the proportion of one-earner couples and reduce the employment levels 
of both men and women living in couples.  
Comparing budget constraints determined on the basis of the 2002 tax and benefit system for 
several stylised types of families we have shown that, contrary to popular belief, the basic 
German system of support for the poorest groups of the population is not more generous relative 
to its British counterpart. This outcome implies that, at least relative to the UK system, there is 
little room for policies aimed at increasing employment through reductions in the values of 
support at the lower end of the income-distribution scale. The most important two differences 
between the two tax and benefit systems (as reflected in the budget constraints) are in-work 
support and joint taxation of couples. Although, as noted above, in-work support conditional on 
joint family income may not be the best solution for Germany from the point of view of 
increasing the employment rates of individuals in couples, this does not mean that every form of 
in-work support would fail. In fact, the simulation results for singles are encouraging and, as we 
have argued, if combined with childcare support could result in an even higher employment 
response than that estimated in this paper. Implementing tax credits for couples, however, 
would need to take into account the interaction of the labour supplies of both partners, and so 
perhaps be based on individual rather than joint family income. Taking into account the 
employment patterns among couples with children, another option to consider would be to limit 
tax credits to only those couples with the youngest children. As Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) 
demonstrated, the system of joint taxation of couples is to some extent responsible for the 
employment patterns we observe in Germany. A careful combination of a move away from joint 
taxation with a cautious design of in-work support could perhaps ‘do the trick’. 
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Appendix 
Discrete choice labour-supply estimation 
Discrete choice models of labour supply are based on the assumption that a household can 
choose among a finite number, J+1, of working hours (J positive hours points and non-
participation); each hour j=0,.J corresponds to a given level of disposable income Cij and each 
discrete bundle of leisure and income provides a different level of utility. In effect, the choices 
j=0,...J of a couple correspond simply to all the combinations of the spouses’ discrete hours (see 
for instance van Soest, 1995). The utility Vij derived by household i from making choice j is 
assumed to depend on a function U of spouses’ leisure Lfij, Lmij, disposable income Cij and 
household characteristics Zi, and on a random term εij. When the error term εij is assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed across alternatives and households according to an 
extreme value distribution, McFadden (1974) proves that the probability that alternative k is 
chosen by household i is given by: 
0
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The likelihood of a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and 
maximised to estimate the parameters of function U. We assume a quadratic specification of the 
utility function as in Blundell et al. (2000). In the estimation we do not consider the potential 
effects of unobserved heterogeneity, which implies that the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property holds. Nevertheless, Haan (2006) has shown that labour supply 
elasticities, estimated on the same data as in the present study, do not differ significantly when 
unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. 
We estimate three separate models: the labour supply of 706 single men, the labour supply of 
902 single women and a joint labour-supply model for men and women in couples (3,367). The 
full specification of the model and results of the estimations are discussed in detail in Bargain et 
al. (2005). 
Simulating employment effects 
In the present non-linear model, labour employment effects need to be derived numerically. 
Instead of the ‘aggregated frequencies’ technique, i.e. aggregating over the whole sample the 
expected individual hour supply, we follow the calibration method, which is consistent with the 
probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level (Creedy & Duncan, 2002). It consists of 
drawing for each household a set of J+1 random terms from the extreme value distribution until 
a vector of random terms is found that generates a perfect match between predicted and 
observed hour supply. In a second step, these draws are used for predicting labour supply 
responses to a particular tax reform, and averaging them over a large number of draws provides 
robust transition matrices. APPLY WITH CAUTION: INTRODUCING UK-STYLE IN-WORK SUPPORT IN GERMANY | 21 
 
Table A1. Employment rates of single individuals in the UK, 1996 and 1999 
  Employment rate (in %) 
  UK (1996)  UK (1999)  
All singles  61.93  65.89 
Male singles  67.46  70.18 
Female singles  56.00  60.90 
Singles without children <17  68.02  70.52 
Singles with children <17  38.67  46.51 
Singles with children: youngest 0-3  21.82  25.92 
Singles with children: youngest 4-6  34.64  43.08 
Singles with children: youngest 7-16  48.33  56.51 
Source: FRS (1996 & 1999). 
Table A2. Employment rates of individuals in couples in the UK, 1996 and 1999 
  Employment rate (in %) 
  UK (1996)  UK (1999) 
  Men Women Men Women 
All couples  84.74  69.39  86.82  71.93 
Couples no children <17  82.50  75.30  84.52  76.94 
Couples with children <17  86.89  63.70  89.07  67.00 
Couples with children – youngest: 0-3  87.26  49.82  90.92  53.23 
Couples with children – youngest: 4-6  86.73  65.13  89.60  68.40 
Couples with children – youngest: 7-16  86.66  74.16  87.62  75.91 
Source: FRS (1996 & 1999). 
Table A3. Employment rates of individuals in couples in the UK, 1996 and 1999 (in %) 
Proportion by employment 
status 
All 
couples 
No child 
<17 in 
family 
Child 
<17 in 
family 
Youngest 
child aged 
0-3 
Youngest 
child aged 
4-6 
Youngest 
child aged 
7-16 
UK – 1996             
Two-earner 63.69  67.47  60.05  47.62  61.96  69.19 
Single-earner – man employed 21.05 15.03  26.84  39.64  24.77  17.47 
Single-earner – woman employed 5.70  7.83  3.65  2.20  3.17  4.97 
No-earner 9.57  9.67  9.46  10.54  10.09  8.37 
Number of couples (in 1,000s)  9361  4589  4772  1745  826  2201 
UK – 1999             
Two-earner 66.52  69.87  63.23  50.93  64.61  71.15 
Single-earner – man employed 20.30 14.65  25.84  39.99  24.99  16.47 
Single-earner – woman employed 5.41  7.07  3.77  2.30  3.79  4.76 
No-earner 7.77  8.40  7.16  6.78  6.61  7.61 
Number of couples (in 1,000s) 9,219 4,568  4,651  1,559  811  2,281 
Source: FRS (1996 & 1999).  
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REVISER was launched by several members of the ENEPRI network in August 2003. 
The project was financed under the programme on Improving the Human Research 
Potential & the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base of the 5
th EU Research Framework 
Programme.  
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research institutes:  
 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
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